by Lloyd's List
19 November 2024 (Lloyd's List) - THE Houthi’s targeting of maritime shipping in the Red Sea has disrupted international shipping lanes forcing a substantial portion of the world’s fleet to divert around Africa for a year now.
However, the Red Sea is certainly not closed for business, with a fleet emerging which remains undeterred by the threats posed by the Iran-backed militants.
Traffic through the Bab el Mandeb is down approximately 60% year on year and has been at this level for approximately six months.
This means that every week there are over 200 ships that continue to sail through the volatile route that borders Houthi-controlled Yemen territory.
While a far cry from the 550 that would normally pass through the Bab el Mandeb, it does prove that there is no effective shutdown of this shipping lane.
Every sector has a carrier willing to transit the Bab el Mandeb
No one is immune from Red Sea disruptions although some sectors are more significantly affected than others.
Gas tankers and vehicle carriers, for example, have largely ditched Bab el Mandeb transits with traffic volumes down over 90% on normal levels.
Still, while almost all LNG tankers have diverted from the Red Sea, a handful have sailed through on voyages in the last six months.
LNG carriers Pioneer (IMO: 9256602), Everest Energy (IMO: 9243148) and Asya Energy (IMO: 9216298) transited the Bab el Mandeb in September, July and June, respectively.
All are now subject to sanctions for transporting cargo from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project.
Containerships, which led the Red Sea exodus in mid-December, have seen a small recovery in traffic volumes over the course of the year.
This increase in transits does not signal a return to the Red Sea, rather it is reflective of certain carriers taking advantage of the situation to expand Red Sea services.
Dark activity trending downwards
Dark transits through the Bab el Mandeb spiked in the early days of the Houthi attacks while there was still uncertainty over who the Houthis may target and what their capabilities were.
Over time the amount of dark activity has fallen. This is likely a reflection of a certain normalisation of the situation, but it is also possible that those that are transiting do not believe themselves to be at risk and therefore do no feel the need to hide their activity.
In October 5% of total transits happened offline, compared to 7% in April.
Advice to industry regarding enablement of Automatic Identification System data varies.
The US Maritime Administration and Joint Maritime Information Centre have said that transmitting AIS in the Houthi threat area, or in the vicinity of it, puts vessels at greater risk as it aids the Houthis in targeting ships.
Others argue that it is possible for the Houthis to target ships not broadcasting AIS, and importantly those that do disable their systems would be harder to locate if there was an incident.
The master ultimately makes the decision to transit the Bab el Mandeb and Red Sea with AIS on or off.
More China-affiliated vessels running the Red Sea route
Traffic through the Red Sea is gradually slowing, which makes any country that is reporting growth in transits amongst its fleet a relative outlier.
Ships associated with China, either through flag or ownership, made 276 voyages via the Bab el Mandeb in October, the highest number recorded since the initial exodus in December.
China-affiliated vessels completed 238 transits in September and 257 in August.
Another ownership trend is the steady uptick in transits taken by vessels that have all or part of their ownership details missing.
This is partially because of the number of dark fleet* vessels that continue to run the Red Sea gauntlet, accounting for 15% and 13% of transits in September and October, respectively.
Greece-headquartered companies have been some of the most willing users of the Bab el Mandeb since the start of the crisis, but since becoming primary targets for Houthi attacks the number of Greece-affiliated vessel transits has dropped off.
*Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if it is aged 15 years or over, anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery, solely deployed in sanctioned oil trades, and engaged in one or more of the deceptive shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in May 2020. The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled shipping entities such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, or Iran’s National Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.
