by Lloyd's List
THE ceasefire deal in Gaza is a welcome first step towards shipping’s return to the Red Sea, but the real power to re-open the Bab el-Mandeb to all traffic still sits with the Houthis.
For over a year the Iran-backed militant group has effectively been defying international naval operations established to uphold the freedom of navigation, and dictating who gets to sail the international shipping lane connecting the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.
The security of future transits and the timing of commercial decisions to re-route will not be determined by Israel, Hamas or any Western government. It is entirely reliant on the Houthis’ willingness to step down their offensive and they will not be giving up their newfound political power easily.
“The naval response has been sufficient to force the Houthis to a stalemate in that the Bab el Mandeb has not been closed completely, but insufficient to defeat them,” says Mike Plunkett, senior naval platforms analyst at Janes.
“I don’t think we can say that the failure to solve this problem is a naval one, but rather a failure of political will.”
The naval operations have been constrained by the governments that instruct them.
The EU Naval forces Operations Aspides, for example, was never given enough naval vessels to provide protection to all ships.
Since its inception in February 2024, Aspides has supported 586 vessels with 355 receiving close protection. This amounts to less than 6% of transits over that period.
The inability to completely guarantee freedom of navigation for all, which security experts agree would be an extremely difficult task given the circumstances, is largely why shipping continues to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope en masse.
According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence data, traffic through the Bab el Mandeb has been relatively stable for about nine months with transit volumes consistently down 60% on normal levels.
Ian Ralby, chief executive of consultancy IR Consilium, argues that the current international response only addresses a symptom of the problem, and the Red Sea will not truly be free for navigation until governments understand the Houthi threat and have the will to target the group’s strategic goals and progress, which is territory.
“The Houthis don’t care about the maritime space. They don’t care about getting bombed. They like getting bombed; it gives them attention,” says Ralby.
“They’ve actually been inspired, and other groups around the world are getting inspired to attack shipping because it has been so successful in creating global attention, momentum, funding, financing, and recruitment for the Houthis.”
For now, there is no indication of any major shift in the approach to the Houthis or Red Sea.
“I’m reasonably certain that both the UK and the USA will remain committed to the region, but I’m less certain about EU member states,” says International Institute for Strategic Studies senior fellow Wolf-Christian Paes.
The scarcity of suitable naval assets and the fact that the EU’s economic interests have not been affected as much as was anticipated means EU members are left with a strategic choice.
This would either be a more comprehensive and robust approach, beyond a naval response, or they will have to cut their losses and redeploy elsewhere.
“I expect that the EU will do neither and rather continue to ‘muddle through’,” says Paes.
The Houthis have gained significant political leverage over the last 12 months and are unlikely to relinquish this power just because a ceasefire has been agreed between Israel and Hamas.
In the absence of a meaningful political commitment to bolster naval capacity to uphold the freedom of navigation or a shift in strategy, the Houthis will continue to pose a latent threat to the shipping community.
