No evidence more Chinese or Russian ships transiting Bab el Mandeb

No evidence more Chinese or Russian ships transiting Bab el Mandeb

Houthis have made public promises to Moscow and Beijing guaranteeing safe passage of their ships, but this has done little to change the flow of traffic in the Red Sea, according to vessel-tracking data

17 April 2024 (Lloyd's List) - REASSURANCES from Houthi representatives that China- and Russia-affiliated vessels will not be targeted when sailing off Yemen territory has had no positive impact on transit volumes.


Bloomberg reported last month that the Houthis held talks in Oman between China and Russia to solidify past public promises that ships from either state will be guaranteed safe passage through the Bab el Mandeb, in exchange for political support on the international stage.


At the time, security analysts questioned the legitimacy of the information given the anonymity of the source and raised issue with how this would work in practice.


Despite promises to Beijing and Moscow that their vessels are not under threat, fewer ships affiliated with the countries are transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence data.


Affiliation is defined by a vessel being flagged with China or Russia or having a beneficial owner, registered owner or technical manager based in these countries.


In November 2023, the last normal month of shipping traffic in the region before Houthi attacks escalated causing a mass exodus of major shipping lines, 488 different China-affiliated, cargo-carrying ships transited the Bab el Mandeb across 515 voyages.


In March this year, 218 China-linked, cargo-carrying vessels passed between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over 234 voyages.


The number of Chinese vessels willing to transit the Bab el Mandeb has more than halved against the “normal” and is down 49% from March 2023.


The perception that China-affiliated ships are at lesser risk of being targeted when navigating the shipping lanes off the coast of Yemen has led to masters indicating relationships with China using the destination field within Automatic Identification System data.


Of the 1,000 vessels that transited the Bab el Mandeb in March some 161 vessels signalled that they were either owned by Chinese companies or had Chinese nationals on board.


General cargoship Han Hui (IMO: 9184550) and product tanker XT Dolphin (IMO: 9672478) went so far as to communicate links to China’s government when passing Yemen territory.

  

While there has been a noticeable decline in the number of Chinese ships transiting the Bab el Mandeb, Russia-affiliated vessels have shown an almost negligible change in sailings.


Some 33 Russian ships sailed the shipping lanes off the coast of Yemen in March over 37 voyages.


In November 2023, 36 Russian ships made the voyage 42 times, and in March 2023 these figures were 43 and 48, respectively.


Most of the Russia-owned vessels transiting last month were crude oil tankers belonging to US sanctioned Sovcomflot, while several containerships operated by Russia’s Far East Shipping Company also passed through.


While the number of Russia and China linked ships transiting the Bab el Mandeb has fallen, these ships account for a larger number of passings because of the unwillingness of other states to send vessels and take their chances with the Houthis.

  

Ships affiliated with Japan and Germany were some of the most active users of the Bab el Mandeb before the security situation deteriorated.


Since then, transits have dwindled to only a fraction of pre-crisis levels. 


In March, just 13 Japanese linked ships sailed through the shipping lane bordering Yemen, down from 260 in November and 225 of March last year.


A senior representative of the Houthis, in an interview with All-Nippon News Network at the end of January, said that Japanese ships could again be targeted for the country’s stance on the Israel-Hamas war.


The first vessel targeted by the Houthis was the car carrier Galaxy Leader (IMO: 9237307), which was hijacked on November 19.


Galaxy Leader was chartered by Japan’s NYK Line.


Greek vessels too, which were active users of the Bab el Mandeb before the Houthis began targeting commercial shipping, are increasingly avoiding the strait.


In November, 456 Greece-affiliated vessels passed between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, this dropped to 330 in January and fell further in March to just 190. 


It is not surprising that many shipowners are avoiding the Bab el Mandeb rather than trust the Houthis ability to accurately identify their self-proclaimed targets which are vessels associated with the US, UK and Israel.


According to the Joint Maritime Information Center, an entity that operates under the Combined Maritime Forces, the Houthis have and approximate 67% success rate in targeting ships that fit their “hit list” profile.


The most recent successful attack, where a vessel was actually struck by a missile launched by the Houthis, was against the 115,459 dwt crude oil tanker Huang Pu (IMO: 9402469) on March 23.


Huang Pu is a China-run vessel and was laden with Russian oil at the time of the attack, reinforcing why shipping should take any promises from the Houthis with a grain of salt.


Since the Iran-backed militants started making threats against commercial shipping, traffic through the Bab el Mandeb is less than half of its “normal” level.

 

Source: Lloyd's List