12 July 2023 (Lloyd's List) - THE flag state responsible for the Ever Given says that a multitude of factors caused the infamous grounding of the megamax containership in the Suez Canal in 2021, although the apparent erratic actions of the local pilots come in for particular criticism.

The Panama Maritime Authority’s marine safety investigation report, published this week, states that “a series of events and factors” influenced the grounding of the ship, although poor communications by two pilots provided by the Suez Canal Authority appear to have been a major factor in the grounding.

The 20,000 teu Ever Given (IMO: 9811000) ran aground on March 23, 2021, while undertaking a northbound transit of the Suez Canal on its regular Asia/Europe liner service. The casualty occurred in a narrow part of the canal, where only one-way traffic can be undertaken. The grounding resulted in the closure of the canal for six days and the backing up of over 400 ships before the vessel was re-floated.

According to Panama’s report, the first pilot came on board at 0548 hrs to start the convoy and to position Ever Given at the entrance of the Suez Canal. The report states that there was some confusion on the part of the pilot about the vessel’s position in the convoy, although the first part of the transit was uneventful.  

After entry of the vessel into the Suez Canal approach channel, the original pilot was replaced by two new pilots at 0716 hrs local time, with one provided for directing conning orders and the other for observing and monitoring.

Following the pilot handover, wind speed began to increase and visibility was severely reduced by sand for two minutes. During this period, the pilots had difficulty maintaining position in the centre of the channel.

“The pilot ordered additional full ahead to increase speed and assist with steering. This order was complied with and the speed was increased to 12 knots. After the wind had increased, the pilot was issuing more helm orders to the helmsman. These were either for hard to port or for hard to starboard, with no midships or lesser helm orders in between,” the report said.

The Suez Canal’s designated maximum speed is 8-9 knots.

At around 0738 hrs, the helmsman reported that the vessel had stopped turning to port and was starting to turn to starboard. At the time, the vessel was close to the port bank of the canal and the speed had increased to about 13 knots over the ground.

The vessel then started to turn quickly to starboard, away from the port bank. The pilot initially ordered the rudder to port 20 degrees and then hard to port to stop the vessel from turning. 

“The first pilot reduced speed to half ahead and the vessel continued to turn to starboard. There was another communication between the two pilots in Arabic language and the main engine was increased to full ahead again. The vessel continued to turn starboard, towards the starboard canal bank.”

The pilot again ordered hard to port in an effort to steady the heading, but the vessel continued turning to starboard. The main engine revolutions were then increased to full ahead but the ship continued to swing to starboard. The vessel continued on its heading until it grounded at a speed of 12 knots on the eastern bank of the canal at 0741 hrs.

Panama’s report into the incident states that the Suez Canal’s vessel traffic management service and the two pilots, as well as the vessel’s master had not properly evaluated the strong winds and reduced visibility as a risk condition for such a large high-sided container vessel as Ever Given. 

“The vessel did not implement relative preventive measures against bad weather conditions, [in other words] to be aided by tugs as indicated in Suez Canal rules, or even to postpone her Suez Canal transiting. The non-use of tugs in a restricted area to better control the manoeuvrability of the ship contributed to the occurrence of the grounding.”

The report states that the pilots undertook pilotage without requesting assistance from the vessel’s master, who was more familiar with vessel manoeuvring characteristics. While the master did intervene in the orders given by the pilot, having instructed the helmsman to keep the ship in the middle of the channel, they were not effective in preventing the grounding.

Discussions between the two pilots were undertaken in local Arabic language and, as a result, the vessel’s bridge team, who were of Indian nationality and did not understand Arabic, were unable to interpret the pilots’ concerns, and potential hazards, in order to “time and effectively conduct a risk assessment, implement corrective actions”.

The report states that translation of the recording of bridge conversations found that the pilots were arguing prior to the grounding.  

Suez Canal regulations state the maximum permissible speed for ships is 8.64 knots, while the Ever Given was sailing at a speed well in excess of this prior to the grounding.

As a consequence, squat and bank effect directly influenced the loss of manoeuvrability of the ship.

Panama Maritime Authority’s marine safety investigation report provides a long list of recommendations for vessel operators and the Suez Canal authorities as a direct consequence of the Ever Given incident.

These include that prior to any transit in the Suez Canal, a vessel’s master should establish clear communication during pilotage, while it recommends that the pilot and the captain in the familiarisation meeting prior to starting navigation in the Suez Canal, establish the language in which communications will be carried out.

This is preferably English, which is the commonly accepted language for global shipboard communications.

It also recommends that the bridge team should not be over-confident about the pilot’s abilities while in certain situations. A pilot may not be familiar with the idiosyncratic design of a vessel’s manoeuvring characteristics, “which could lead to undesirable circumstances”.

It also recommends that the Suez Canal Authority should consider reviewing its procedures and regulations, as well as training of Suez Canal pilots “in order to ensure vessel safety navigation transit within Canal and minimise the risk of grounding”.

“As the marine industry trends to build larger vessels, training of Suez Canal pilots with respect to manoeuvring within the canal of large size vessels, as well as with the effect of wind especially to containers vessels, should be considered as mandatory.”

Panama also recommends refresher courses for Suez Canal pilots to better understand vessel squat and bank suction on different types of vessel that transit the canal.

“The Suez Canal Authority should develop and implement contingency plan procedures, including details for tug assistance and the same should be shared with the master and be included in a transit risk assessment conducted by the bridge team.”

Due to the lack of large tugs available at the time of the Ever Given incident, its recommendations conclude that the bollard pulls of tugs available in the Suez Canal for salvage should be appropriate according to the size of the vessel.